Correlated sources are present in communication systems where protocols ensure that there is some predetermined information for sources. Here correlated sources across an eavesdropped channel that incorporate a heterogeneous encoding scheme and their effect on the information leakage when some channel information and a source have been wiretapped is investigated. The information leakage bounds for this scenario are provided. Further, an implementation method using a matrix partition approach is described.
I. INTRODUCTION
Practical communication systems make use of correlated sources, for example smart grid meters. Each smart grid meter for a particular grid conforms to certain protocols and this means that certain information (e.g. date, area, etc.) in the header files will be the same for various meters. From the receiver's (or an eavesdropper's) perspective, it appears as common information shared between the meters. This is therefore pre-existing or known information for an eavesdropper. Thus, correlated sources are common in systems transmitting information, e.g. smart grid meter systems. This implies that the theory used for correlated sources may also be applied to this type of system.
In practical communication systems links are prone to eavesdropping and as such this work incorporates wiretapped channels, more specifically the wiretap channel II. In work by Aggarwal et al. [1] it is seen that an eavesdropper can be active and can erase/modify bits. They develop a perfect secrecy model for this scenario. The eavesdropper that we investigate is a passive wiretapper, who cannot modify information. The mathematical model for this wiretap channel has been given by Rouayheb et al. [2] , and can be explained as follows: the channel between a transmitter and receiver is error-free and can transmit n symbols from which μ of them can be observed by the eavesdropper and the maximum secure rate can be shown to equal n − μ symbols. The wiretap channel II was described by Ozarow and Wyner [3] with a coset coding scheme. In this work we use an information theory approach and provide a link to coding theory. There has been work done on wiretap channels for a coding approach. The first was done by Wei [4] who presented the generalized Hamming weight to describe the minimum uncertainty that an eavesdropper has access to. Thereafter characteristics on this channel were introduced by Luo et al. [5] .
Any extra information that the eavesdropper has access to can be considered as side information to assist with decoding. Villard and Piantanida [6] have also looked at correlated sources and wiretap networks: A source sends information to the receiver and an eavesdropper has access to information correlated to the source, which is used as side information. There is a second encoder that sends a compressed version of its own correlation observation of the source privately to the receiver. Here, the authors show that the use of correlation decreases the required communication rate and increases secrecy. Villard et al. [7] have explored this side information concept further where security using side information at the receiver and eavesdropper is investigated. Side information is generally used to assist the decoder to determine the transmitted message. An earlier work involving side information was done by Yang et al. [8] . The concept can be considered to be generalized in that the side information could represent a source. It is an interesting problem when one source is more important and Hayashi and Yamamoto [9] have considered it in another scheme with two sources, where only one source is secure against wiretappers and the other must be transmitted to a legitimate receiver. They develop a security criterion based on the number of correct guesses of a wiretapper to attain a message. In this paper the source data symbols may be seen as side information to the eavesdropper, which is further explained in Section II.
Shannon's secrecy model is an interesting avenue for this work. Previous work [10] has looked at a model for Shannon's cipher system when there is wiretapping at the channel only. Merhav [11] investigated similarly, for a model using the additional parameters of the distortion of the source reconstruction at the legitimate receiver, the bandwidth expansion factor of the coded channels, and the average transmission cost.
In the model presented herein two correlated sources and a third source having correlation to one other source, which may also be wiretapped is considered. The paper is arranged in five sections. Section II puts forth a description of the model and Section III presents the information leakage quantification for this model. The information leakage is a new concept developed and quantifies how much of information the adversary/eavesdropper has access to. In Section IV, the practical investigation is detailed. Thereafter, the paper is concluded in Section V.
II. MODEL
The independent, identically distributed (i.i.d.) sources X, Y and Z are mutually correlated random variables, depicted in Figure 1 . The alphabet sets for sources X, Y and Z are represented by X and Y and Z respectively. Assume that X K and Y K are encoded into two channel information portions represented by their common and private information portions. We can write
where T X and T Y are the channel information of X and Y respectively. The Venn diagram in Figure 2 easily illustrates this idea. Each source is composed of K bits, and for source Z K , μ of these symbols are considered as the predetermined information and is leaked to the wiretapper (μ ≤ K). Figure 1 . Correlated source coding for heterogeneous encoding scheme with X and Y transmitting compressed information
The relation between private and common information
This encoding scheme, as specified in [12] reaches the Slepian-Wolf bound. Here, the length of T X and T Y is not fixed, as it depends on the encoding process and nature of the Slepian-Wolf codes. The correlated sources X, Y and Z transmit messages (in the form of some channel information) to the receiver along the wiretap channel. The decoder determines X and Y only after receiving T X and T Y . The eavesdropper has access to either the common or private portions given by T X and T Y and the eavesdropped source information Z μ . The effect is that the eavesdropper has access to some compressed information (that is transmitted across the communication link after encoding) and some uncompressed information (i.e. the source Z's data symbols). It is valuable to determine how much of information this eavesdropper has access to when wiretapping the private or common information portions (this is described in the next section).
Here, for X K and Y K typical set encoding and decoding is used. We are able to determine bin indices for the typical sequence from the indices passed over the communication channel. When common or private information from the syndromes are wiretapped it gives an indication of which row/column in the specific look up table the sequence is contained within. The encoding and decoding for X and Y has been described in detail in previous work [12] . The decoding probabilities follow.
From the Venn diagram we see that the private information and common information produced by each source should contain almost no redundancy. Here, V CX , V X , V Y , V CY are asymptotically disjoint, which ensures that there is almost no redundant information sent to the decoder.
To explore this code, we first define the prototype code: For any 0 ≥ 0 and sufficiently large K, there exits a code
We can see that (1) -(4) mean
Hence from (1), (7) and the ordinary source coding theorem, (W X , W Y , W CX and W CY ) have almost no redundancy for sufficiently small 0 ≥ 0. The encoding and decoding defined by the existence of the prototype code provided by (1) - (7) has been proven in [10] . It is also noted that Z may overlap either the private or common portions of X and Y .
This model can cater for a scenario where a particular source, say Y needs to be more secure than X (possibly because of eavesdropping on the Y channel only); we would need to secure the information that could be compromised. A masking approach to achieve this is described in previous work [12] .
III. INFORMATION LEAKAGE
In order to determine the security of the system, a measure for the amount of information leaked has been developed. The obtained information and total uncertainty are used to determine the leaked information. Information leakage is indicated using L P Q . Here P indicates the set of sources for which information leakage is being quantified. Further, Q indicates the transmitted sequence that has been wiretapped.
The information leakage bound for the cases where information from all three links (with reference to Figure 1 these are the links T X , T Y , Z μ ) are wiretapped is investigated. There are two cases considered: leakage on Y when T Y , T X , Z μ are wiretapped and leakage on X when T Y , T X , Z μ are wiretapped.
The information leakage for these cases is as follows:
Here, T X and T Y are the compressed sequences and in terms of the information quantity they include either the private or common portion. Thus, we can see the above bound as a generalised result for wiretapping Xs or Y s links, when the source Z is leaked. The portion Z μ could be leaked with respect to source X and Y .
The information leakage bounds in (8) and (9) have been proven in the extended version of this work [13] . The extended version also contains the Shannon cipher system approach, which provides bounds of transmission and key rates for perfect secrecy.
This section shows the information leakage for when various portions of the channel information and some source data symbols are leaked. It is evident that the eavesdropper has more information about a particular source than if only one or two links transmitting compressed information were wiretapped. This can be drawn from a comparison of some previous work [10] . Another interesting variation that considers when the eavesdropper has access to predetermined information has been explored by Balmahoon et al. [14] . The interesting cases explored for (8) and (9) demonstrate that the source Z contributes to leakage for X and Y ; this is due to the common information shared between them.
The portions mentioned in the bounds can be identified in the Venn diagram to show a graphical representation. When the information from X, Y and the μ leaked bits from Z are wiretapped the amount of information leaked is restricted by the bounds. The bounds also indicate the terms to which the leaked information corresponds. Therefore, the information leakage bounds play a role in determining the security of the system.
Equations (8) and (9) indicate that the information leakage is upper bounded by the common information portions indicated. The information leakage in (8) and (9) can be reduced if the common information portions are secured. These equations (8) and (9) may be verified using the Venn diagram in Figure 2 .
IV. IMPLEMENTATION
In this section the aim is to determine the equivocation (uncertainty) in retrieving the message from the transmitted channel information. We follow the convention used by Stankovic et al. [15] to present an example together with a method incorporating generator matrix ranks put forth by Luo et al. [5] and determine the equivocation. The Hamming distances are represented as follows: d H (X K , Y K ) ≤ 1 and d H (Y K , Z K ) ≤ 1. It is noted that there is some sort of correlation between X and Z due to the Hamming distance relations between (X K , Y K ) and (Y K , Z K ).
The following generator matrix G is used: There is compression along X's and Y 's channel. As per the matrix partition method the syndrome for X and Y is comprised of:
where P T 1 is the G matrix transpose of rows 1-2 and columns 5-7 and P T 2 is the G matrix transpose of rows 3-4 and columns 5-7. The generator matrices used by X and Y to achieve these syndromes are G X and G Y respectively.
This results in syndromes of [1 1 1 0 0] for X and
Here, the equivocation for these cases can be found using the G matrix specified above and a sub matrix of G. As per Luo et al. [5] , the equivocation is given by:
Next, the information leakage for each of the following cases is analyzed:
In order to show the most representative results for each of the cases the scenarios contributing to the minimum and maximum information leakage have been considered.
Before the information leakage method is described certain variables are introduced. Here, μ TX and μ TY represent the number of wiretapped bits from T X and T Y respectively. The length of the information bits from each syndrome is represented as l X i and l Y i for X K and Y K respectively. The length of parity bits with respect to X K or Y K is denoted as l p , and the following can be developed: l X i + l Y i + 2l p is the overall length of T X and T Y . Hence we have: 0 ≤ μ TX ≤ l X i + l p and 0 ≤ μ TY ≤ l Y i + l p . Note that the leakage is determined using a combination of the information and parity bits and the parity matrix H rank. The H matrix rank is used to determine how much of information is leaked from the wiretapped bits, when the columns corresponding to the wiretapped bits have been removed. Let H denote the H matrix with the wiretapped columns removed.
The case for the leakage on (X K , Y K ) when (T X , T Y ) is leaked is now considered. Initially we consider when the maximum leakage is reached. When μ TX ≤ l X i and μ TY ≤ l Y i , the maximum leakage is μ TX + μ TY + rank(H) − rank(H ). This considers when the information bits (namely v 1 and u 2 ) have been leaked only. Next, if μ TX > l X i and μ TY > l Y i is considered. For this case min(μ TX − l X i , μ TY − l Y i ) parity bits can be from the corresponding positions in P T
. Now we consider when the minimum leakage is reached. When μ TX ≤ l p and μ TY ≤ l p , the minimum leakage is max(0, μ TX +μ TY − l p ) + rank(H) − rank(H ). This considers when the parity bits (namely P T 1 a T 1 ⊕ q T 1 and P T 2 a T 2 ⊕ q T 2 ) have been leaked only. Otherwise, the minimum leakage is μ TX + μ TY − l p + rank(H) − rank(H ). For the numerical example considered the information leakage as represented above is depicted in Figure 3 . Next the information leakage for the second and third cases are determined. The leakage for these cases reach the same limit for the minimum and maximum cases of information leakage, however the information leakage peak occurs at different points depending on which bits (information or parity) are leaked first. The leakage for the second and third cases respectively are as follows:
Using the numerical example for this section, the graphical representation is in Figure 4 . The maximum case depicted is when the information bits are initially wiretapped and the minimum case is where the parity bits are initially wiretapped. Now the information leakage on (X K , Y K ) when μ bits of source Z is leaked is considered, which is done in two steps. First, since d H (Y K , Z K ) ≤ 1, if there are 0 < μ ≤ K bits (μ = 0 is considered earlier in this section), the number of possible sequences including repeated sequences is 2 K−μ (K + 1). However, there are 2 K−μ different sequences repeated K − μ + 1 times and there are μ2 K−μ different sequences that possibly occur once. Second, from every possible Y K , there are eight possible sequences for X K with identical possibilities. Therefore, the information leakage due to Z μ with respect to X K and Y K is detailed in (10). 
where H(X K , Y K ) = 10, H(X K |Y K ) = 3 and K = 7.
The information leakage represented in (10) may be used in the cases explored in this section to separately determine the information leakage of Z μ on X K and Y K .
In this example certain bits have more equivocation than others and as such which bits are wiretapped plays a role in making the system vulnerable at different times. For instance, following from the third case if only T Y is wiretapped from the parity bits then for the first 3 bits there is no information leakage due to T Y as the wiretapper would have encountered the masked bits. The information leakage occurs after the third bit, when u 2 is wiretapped. This therefore shows an upper and lower bound on the uncertainty, where the upper bound is given when bits u 2 is leaked first and the lower bound is given when the masked portion is first leaked. The parity bits are masked and are thus more difficult to be leaked to an adversary. Parity bits from both sources need to be wiretapped and in the same positions in order to leak information. In addition the Z μ bits also contribute to the information leakage and the correlation between X K , Y K and Z μ plays a role in determining the overall leakage.
In general, for a systematic code the columns that have a weight of one would contribute one bit to the information leakage entirely. With use of the matrix partition approach, if the parity bits of both T X and T Y are wiretapped (and these bits are from the same columns in each generator matrix) then for every two parity bits wiretapped there is one bit of information leaked. The parity bits and the information bits can also be used to solve the parity matrix to determine the information leakage. If the wiretapped parity bits do not belong to the same columns then there is no information leakage at that point.
This section shows the equivocation for the model set forth in Section II when various portions of the channel information and some source data symbols from Z are leaked.
V. CONCLUSION
Knowing which components contribute most to information leakage aids in keeping the system more secure, as the required terms can be additionally secured. Here, we analyze the effect of an eavesdropper accessing source information in terms of the information leakage. In Section III the information leakage for the three correlated source model with the more powerful adversary was quantified and proven. It is seen that the common information portion and the wiretapped source are the weaknesses when information is leaked to the eavesdropper and will need to be secured for decreasing the information leakage. A method for practical implementation has also been presented using a matrix partition approach.
